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Abstract—Internet of Things (IoT) aims at providing connec-
tivity between every computing entity. However, this facilitation is
also leading to more cyber threats which may exploit the presence
of a vulnerability of a period of time. One such vulnerability is
the zero-day threat that may lead to zero-day attacks which are
detrimental to an enterprise as well as the network security.
In this article, a study is presented on the zero-day threats
for IoT networks and a context graph based framework is
presented to provide a strategy for mitigating these attacks.
The proposed approach uses a distributed diagnosis system for
classifying the context at the central service provider as well
as at the local user site. Once a potential zero-day attack is
identified, a critical data sharing protocol is used to transmit
alert messages and reestablish the trust between the network
entities and the IoT devices. The results show that the distributed
approach is capable of mitigating the zero-day threats efficiently
with 33% and 21% improvements in terms of cost of operation
and communication overheads, respectively, in comparison with
the centralized diagnosis system.
Index Terms—IoT, Zero-day attacks, 5G, context-graphs
I. INTRODUCTION
The communication networks are observing a tremendous
increase in the number of devices which are predicted to
go beyond 40% (of that were active in 2012) by 2020 [1].
All these devices have been arranged under a common term
of “Internet of Things” (IoT). IoT allows integration of the
vast variety of communication devices irrespective of their
operational technology, which is also a challenging issue as a
common firmware is required for all the devices. A common
firmware makes it easier to control and manage various IoT
devices without many overheads. Common software platforms
allow easy configurations as well as easy diagnosis of faulty
operations. However, a common firmware also subjects the
IoT components to various types of threats which can infiltrate
the operational defense of these devices [2]. Some of the key
features required by IoT networks are remote diagnosis and
management, data analytic, software upgrades, information
passing and processing, and user mobility identification [3].
All these form a type of application which allows access to
the entire network once a particular feature is exploited.
Since there is no formal definition of IoT, same attacks
which are applicable to any computing entity hold true in
their case. Also, reduction in the human interventions and
use of more automated systems in the IoT networks make
it extremely important to secure the entire network as it
may reveal critical information [4]. Apart from these, IoT
networks are also considered as an integral part of civilian
and military expeditions focusing surveillance, navigation,
localization, equipment control, and currency transfers, etc.
Recent trends have focused on using RFID tags as embedded
sources for IoT devices that do not connect to the network
directly. Although, such strategy holds safe for the majority
of application scenarios, but manipulation with RFID tags can
easily make these vulnerable similar to a normal computing
entity [5]. Thus, security of IoT devices irrespective of the
mode and type of connectivity is of utmost importance and
has been an area of concern for a majority of the security
researchers across the globe.
Considering a common platform for IoT devices, most of
the business enterprises and vendors focus on making version-
based IoT firmware that can be easily upgraded and controlled.
Such scenarios are possible by using a software-assisted
networking. However, a software-assisted networking suffers
from a major issue of zero-day vulnerabilities. Considering
the level of deployment and configuration of networks, zero-
day vulnerabilities are extremely dangerous for IoT networks.
Exploitation of a zero-day vulnerability can lead to a zero-
day attack [6]. Control over a single unit of IoT software may
expose the entire architecture.
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Fig. 1: An illustration of the window of vulnerability for zero-
day attacks.
II. BACKGROUND: ZERO-DAY ATTACKS
The name “Zero-day” is coined considering the negligible
time available in mitigating these threats. The number of
days for which an anomaly has been known directly affects
the countermeasures and also the probability of remaining
2affected. It also has to do a lot with those software users who
do not update security patches regularly. Once a vulnerability
is publicized, it is mandatory for the particular application
users to immediately switch to the stable releases. However,
failure in doing so leads to various consequences in the form
of cyber attacks [7].
The effect of a zero-day vulnerability also depends on the
mode of detection. If a vulnerability is identified by white
hat hackers, it allows keeping it low profile until the secu-
rity patches are not available; whereas identification of such
vulnerabilities by a notorious group (black hat hackers) may
subject the entire enterprise to failure [6]. The vulnerability
cycle for a zero-day attack may vary from scenario to scenario.
In some cases, after identification of a bug, the hackers operate
covertly leading to the full zero-day attack, while in some
cases, the hackers may come forward (overt) and make threat
public [8] [9]. Thus, it can be analyzed that a zero-day attack
is not only because of the covert behavior of a hacker but also
because of the delays in updating security patches once these
are available in the public domain. This is often explained
in the terms of window of vulnerability. The window of
vulnerability is the time gap in which the number of vulnerable
systems remaining is negligible. It is evaluated as a software
timeline considering the discovery phase, security patching,
intermediate exploitation phase and patch applicability phase,
as shown in Fig. 1 [8] [10].
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Fig. 2: An illustration of DDS-assisted IoT network.
III. PROPOSED APPROACH
The network comprises various IoT devices and gadgets
that operate either individually or collectively via a common
gateway. The communication can be directly between the
Mobile Node (MN) and the IoT device or indirectly between
the MN and the IoT device via a gateway. The service
providers are responsible for maintaining trust between the IoT
and the MN. Currently, the proposed model emphasizes on a
particular scenario in which an IoT device receives security
updates that may lead to zero-day attacks; or when an attack
is already launched and security updates confirm the attacks.
The proposed approach uses strategic context graphs to ensure
the safety of IoT devices against the zero-day attacks. The
context graphs are implemented using Distributed Diagnosis
System (DDS). The DDS are divided into three parts (shown
in Fig. 2), namely,
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Fig. 3: An illustration of strategic context graph formation for
an IoT device between the SDS and CDS. The decision on
matching context is performed at CDS. The counter updates
and firmware version decisions are also evaluated at the SDS
and the CDS.
• Central Diagnosis System (CDS): CDS is installed by
the service providers on the central node of the network
which is responsible for generating trust as well as
the updates for the entire network. CDS is responsible
for managing the Access Points (APs) control, and the
operations of gateways for maintaining security in the
case of high possibilities of threats.
• Local Diagnosis System (LDS): LDS is operated as a
dedicated device over the gateways. Usually, these are
installed with the Home Gateways (HGW). LDS interacts
with the CDS and shares its context graphs with it to
ensure that all the security procedures are followed by
the corresponding IoT device.
• Semi Diagnosis System (SDS): SDS is responsible for
directly managing the APs trust with the CDS. It shares
the context of IoT devices which directly interacts with
an MN without relying on the local gateway.
A. Strategic Context
The types of devices operable in a network are considered to
have valid pre-registered signatures along with a counter value.
The counter value manages the count for the number of times
the firmware of an IoT device is validated or encountered. The
context for each IoT device is managed by its diagnosis system
and periodically stored in logs and shared with the CDS. The
context outline used in the proposed model is as follows:
• Device signatures (Sg): This is the unique identity for
each device. The signature is the embedded information
about the IoT device which is stored at the CDS once it
gets activated in the network.
3• Update Counter (Uc): This is the firmware update counter
which is randomly selected at the beginning of network
registrations. These are updated using random integer
values which are finalized by the CDS and change
periodically without affecting the performance.
• Traffic Type (Tp): This defines the context for the type
of traffic to be generated for and by an IoT device. This
helps the diagnosis system to analyze the content over a
particular channel for its correctness.
• Header Length (Hl): It defines the bit length of the header
field used by the diagnosis system. It contains all the
necessary context metadata which is to be shared between
the LDS, SDS, and CDS.
• Memory Range (Mr): It denotes the maximum and
minimum size of the packets generated by the IoT device.
This helps to simply analyze if the size of the initial code
is affected or not. Usually, these are not mishandled by
the attackers, but still, in some cases, this is very useful
to identify if the binaries of the firmware are altered or
not.
• Route (Rt): This field is used to check whether an IoT
device is operable in LDS, SDS, or CDS region. This also
allows tracking the actual route for managing the context
between the network entities.
B. Context Graphs and Strategic Attack Detection
The context graphs are used to generate the strategies which
help in taking a decision regarding the presence of a threat
amongst the IoT devices. The number of vertices in the context
graphs is equal to the number of processing procedures an IoT
device follows before generating an output and demanding an
input. The context explained above forms the edges of the
graph. After the time instance decided in the configuration of
the network, the LDS and SDS evaluate these graphs for every
corresponding IoT device ad share it with the CDS which also
forms its own context graph for every IoT device. Along with
the context graphs, the CDS also forms the context graphs for
the subordinate network which includes the layers of APs, and
gateways.
In order to take a strategic decision on the management of
IoT devices against the zero-day attacks, the CDS follows a
principle of modeling the counter and the random integer value
used to manage the counter by the LDS, SDS and the device
itself. Then, it performs mutual exclusion rule to trace the
presence of a zero-day threat in the IoT network. The failure
in the matching of the context stored and the context received
from all the subordinates as well as the IoT device indicates
the presence of a zero-day attack. The operational view of the
proposed approach is illustrated in the Fig. 3.
It is to be noted that the strategic context graphs are
applicable in the network only in the deployment phase, but
not in the development phase. Thus, the proposed strategy
can come handy only when a vulnerability is identified by
the development team at lateral stages as well as during the
release of security updates as it helps in tracking the contextual
behavior of every IoT device. Once a possibility of attack is
found, the proposed approach utilizes the critical data sharing
protocol that helps in eliminating a particular IoT device
before it exploits the entire network.
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Fig. 4: An illustration of critical context/data sharing protocol
used after the identification of potential zero-day threat or
attack in the IoT network.
C. Critical Data Sharing Protocol
The proposed approach uses a critical context/data sharing
protocol in the scenarios with a potential zero-day threat. The
protocol, shown in Fig. 4, illustrates the procedures opted by
the CDS once a threat is identified amongst the IoT devices
leading to a zero-day exploitation.
Once a threat policy is violated, the CDS sends alarming
messages to its connected components that are its subordinates
in the network. The alarming messages are followed by the
patch for fixing the affected IoT device. This is followed by the
reestablishment of the trust between all the connected compo-
nents with the CDS. Once an alarming request is received, each
subordinate’s diagnosis system shares context information to
revalidate the trust. By the time, these steps are performed, the
affected device updates its security mechanisms, and registers
itself again with the CDS leading to the elimination of the
threat without eliminating the device. On the contrary, CDS
shares threat information with the SDS, trust information with
the HGW, device information with the LDS, and finally, leads
it to eliminate the incorrect device. This allows mitigating
zero-day threats in IoT networks.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
The proposed approach is evaluated by deploying 500
sensors in two modes, namely, with CDS only and with
CDS, LDS, and SDS. The proposed approach is evaluated to
analyze the effect of DDS on the performance of the proposed
framework. The model defined in Ref. [2] with similar attacker
scenario (20% nodes as the attacker) is used to evaluate the
formation in the proposed approach for cost of operation and
communication overheads. The cost of operation is calculated
as the time required by the diagnosis system to arrive at the
decision of zero-day possibility. It includes the communication
time including the context sharing procedures as well as the
formation of the context graphs at the interacting entities of
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Fig. 5: Simulation Results.
the network. Results in Fig. 5a show that the DDS is capable
of performing better in distributed mode rather than only
CDS scenario, and covers 33% less cost of operation. With
critical protocol coming into play after the identification of a
zero-day threat, the proposed approach utilizes series of steps
to generate alert messages and reestablish the trust between
the connected devices and gateways. The DDS causes 21%
lesser overheads in comparison with the scenario with a single
diagnosis system, as shown in Fig. 5b.
V. CONCLUSION
In this article, a study was presented on zero-day threats for
IoT networks. A context graph based framework was presented
to provide a strategy for deciding on the zero-day attacks.
The proposed approach used a distributed diagnosis system
for classifying the context at the central service provider as
well as at the local user site. Also, once a zero-day attack was
potentially identified, a critical data sharing protocol was used
to transmit alert messages and reestablish the trust between
the network entities and the IoT devices.
This is a progressive paper and the details on the full-
fledged implementation along with critical evaluations will be
presented in future reports.
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